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Collective Dynamic Choice: The Necessity of Time Inconsistency

Jackson, Matthew O. and Yariv, Leeat (2015) Collective Dynamic Choice: The Necessity of Time Inconsistency. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7 (4). pp. 150-178. ISSN 1945-7669.

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We study collective decisions by time-discounting individuals choosing a common consumption stream. We show that with any heterogeneity in time preferences, every Pareto efficient and non-dictatorial method of aggregating utility functions must be time-inconsistent. We also show that decisions made via non-dictatorial voting methods are intransitive.

Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
Jackson, Matthew O.0000-0001-9846-4249
Additional Information:© 2015 American Economic Association. We thank Nageeb Ali, Sandro Ambuehl, James Andreoni, Kenneth Arrow, Mariagiovanna Baccara, Miguel Angel Ballester, Douglas Bernheim, Martin Browning, Christopher Chambers, Jeff Ely, Keith Ericson, Drew Fudenberg, Jerry Green, Olivier l’Haridon, Andrew Hertzberg, Julian Jamison, Lauren Merrill, Jochen Mierau, Massimo Morelli, Efe Ok, Antonio Rangel, Ariel Rubinstein, Erik Snowberg, and Tomasz Strzalecki for useful discussions and suggestions, as well as two anonymous referees for helpful comments. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation (SES 0551014 and SES 0961481) and the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation (Grant 1158).
Funding AgencyGrant Number
NSFSES 0551014
NSFSES 0961481
Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation1158
Issue or Number:4
Classification Code:JEL: D71, D72, D91
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20151130-135309088
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:62457
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:03 Dec 2015 04:16
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 09:19

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