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Appropriations Decisions as a Bilateral Bargaining Game between President and Congress

Kiewiet, D. Roderick and McCubbins, Mathew D. (1985) Appropriations Decisions as a Bilateral Bargaining Game between President and Congress. Legislative Studies Quarterly , 10 (2). pp. 181-202. ISSN 0362-9805 . http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160218-120456706

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Abstract

In this essay we model appropriations decisions as products of a bilateral bargaining game between a reelection-minded president and Congress. The findings bear out the expectation that the two sides jointly pursue a strategy of accommodation. In awarding appropriations, Congress takes into account the president's preferences embodied in the OMB's budget requests; these requests in turn reflected expectations of congressional action. The evidence also reveals that several important exogenous political and economic variables influence both executive and legislative appropriations decisions.


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http://www.jstor.org/stable/439723 JSTORJSTOR Article
Additional Information:An earlier version of this essay was delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1983. We would like to thank Roger Noll, Doug Rivers, Linda Cohen, Keith Krehbiel, Robert Browning, Dick Jankowski, Mark Karnlet, David Mowery, and an anonymous referee for their valuable comments and criticisms.
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160218-120456706
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160218-120456706
Official Citation:Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1985. “Appropriations Decisions as a Bilateral Bargaining Game Between President and Congress”. Legislative Studies Quarterly 10 (2). [Wiley, Comparative Legislative Research Center]: 181–201. http://www.jstor.org/stable/439723.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:64560
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Susan Vite
Deposited On:23 Feb 2016 00:37
Last Modified:23 Feb 2016 00:37

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