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Mechanism Design with Public Goods: Committee Karate, Cooperative Games, and the Control of Social Decisions through Subcommittees

Plott, Charles R. and Merlob, Brian (2015) Mechanism Design with Public Goods: Committee Karate, Cooperative Games, and the Control of Social Decisions through Subcommittees. Social Science Working Paper, 1389. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160222-140238779

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Abstract

Axioms from social choice theory and the core of cooperative games in effectiveness form are used to design an organization that influences a voting group to choose the alternative preferred by a designer. The designer has information about individual preferences and can dictate organization but cannot dictate choice. The designer’s influence works through decision centers (subcommittees). Subcommittee memberships, subcommittee separation, the alternatives available to the subcommittees, the chairpersons and voting rules can be used to create games with appropriate configurations of cores that result in group decisions according to the designer's wishes. The institutions leave considerable flexibility to subcommittee decisions and appear to be fair. Manipulation is not detected. Core alternatives emerge as the group choice. Conflicting individual preferences enable organizational structures such that a wide range of alternative can be made the solution. Experiments demonstrate that the resulting model is a very accurate predictor of the group choice.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:The financial support of the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation and the Caltech Laboratory of Experimental Economics and Political Science are gratefully acknowledged.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Gordon and Betty Moore FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160222-140238779
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160222-140238779
Official Citation: Charles R. Plott, Brian Merlob. Mechanism Design with Public Goods: Committee Karate, Cooperative Games and the Control of Social Decisions through Subcommittees. Pasadena, CA: California Institute of Technology, 2015. Social Science Working Paper, 1389.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:64640
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Susan Vite
Deposited On:02 Mar 2016 22:06
Last Modified:02 Mar 2016 22:15

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