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Flip-Flopping, Primary Visibility and the Selection of Candidates

Agranov, Marina (2012) Flip-Flopping, Primary Visibility and the Selection of Candidates. Social Science Working Paper, 1369. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160229-095607758

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Abstract

We present an incomplete information model of two-stage elections in which candidates can choose different platforms in primaries and general elections. Voters do not directly observe the chosen platforms, but infer the candidates' ideologies from observing candidates' campaigns. The ability of voters to detect candidates' types depends on the visibility of the race. This model captures two patterns: the post-primary moderation effect, in which candidates pander to the party base during the primary and shift to the center in the general election; and the divisive-primary effect, which refers to the detrimental effect of hard-fought primaries on a party's general-election prospects.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
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http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171102-155700804Related ItemLater version published in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Additional Information:I would like to thank Andrew Schotter and Alessandro Lizzeri for the invaluable help and encouragement they have provided during the course of this project. I thank Alex Agranov for suggesting the idea for this paper. I also thank Elliott Ash, Mark Dean, Matthew Embrey, Guillaume Frechette, Alessandro Gavazza, Anna Ingster, Daniel Martin, Rebecca Morton, Nicola Persico, Pietro Ortoleva, Debraj Ray, Ofer Setty, Chloe Tergiman, Emanuel Vespa and seminar participants at New York University for their useful comments.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:primaries, information transmission, strategic voting
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1369
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160229-095607758
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160229-095607758
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:64841
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Susan Vite
Deposited On:02 Mar 2016 23:30
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 09:41

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