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Ignorance is Bliss: An Experimental Study of the Use of Ambiguity and Vagueness in the Coordination Games with Asymmetric Payoffs

Agranov, Marina and Schotter, Andrew (2012) Ignorance is Bliss: An Experimental Study of the Use of Ambiguity and Vagueness in the Coordination Games with Asymmetric Payoffs. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 4 (2). pp. 77-103. ISSN 1945-7669. doi:10.1257/mic.4.2.77. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160229-143431181

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Abstract

We consider a game where one player, the Announcer, has to communicate the value of a payoff relevant state of the world to a set of players who play a coordination game with multiple equilibria. While the Announcer and the players agree that coordination is desirable, since the payoffs of the players at the equilibria are unequal, they disagree as to which equilibrium is best. We demonstrate experimentally that in such coordination games, in order to mask the asymmetry of equilibrium payoffs, it may be advantageous for a utilitarian benevolent Announcer to communicate in an ambiguous or vague manner.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.4.2.77DOIArticle
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.4.2.77PublisherArticle
Additional Information:© 2012 American Economic Association. This research was performed under grant number SES-0721111 of the National Science Foundation. We would also like to thank the Center for Experimental Social Science at New York University for its research.
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
NSFSES-0721111
Issue or Number:2
Classification Code:JEL C71, D81, D83
DOI:10.1257/mic.4.2.77
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160229-143431181
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160229-143431181
Official Citation:Agranov, Marina, and Andrew Schotter. 2012. "Ignorance Is Bliss: An Experimental Study of the Use of Ambiguity and Vagueness in the Coordination Games with Asymmetric Payoffs." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 4(2): 77-103.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:64860
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Susan Vite
Deposited On:29 Feb 2016 22:59
Last Modified:10 Nov 2021 23:36

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