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Transparency Versus Back-Room Deals in Bargaining

Agranov, Marina and Tergiman, Chloe (2014) Transparency Versus Back-Room Deals in Bargaining. Social Science Working Paper, California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA.

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We design an experiment to study the effects of transparency on bargaining processes. We show that whether transparency arises endogenously depends on the degree of competition between subjects. In a competitive setting there is no transparency: subjects use private communication channels to compete for favors from those in power and establish backroom deals. In the absence of competition the bargaining process is transparent: subjects communicate publicly and outcomes are more egalitarian. We further show that in a competitive setting, imposing transparency by requiring all communication to be public reduces the observed competition between subjects and leads to more egalitarian outcomes.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:This research was made possible thanks to generous grant support from the Social Science Humanities and Research Council. The authors would like to thank Pedro Dal Bo, Gary Bolton, Alessandra Casella, Timothy Cason, Eric Dickson, Sanford Gordon, Alessandro Lizzeri, Rebecca Morton, Muriel Niederle, as well as the seminar participants at Florida State University, London School of Economics, Penn State University, Purdue University, Stanford University, the University of British Columbia, and finally the conference participants of the Economic Science Association (2013), the Public Choice Meetings (2014), the Royal Economic Society (2014) and the Design and Bargaining Workshop in Dallas (2014).
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Social Science Humanities and Research CouncilUNSPECIFIED
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160229-145809760
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:64869
Deposited By: Susan Vite
Deposited On:03 Mar 2016 00:25
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 09:41

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