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Multiple-Object, Discriminatory Auctions with Bidding Constraints: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

Palfrey, Thomas R. (1980) Multiple-Object, Discriminatory Auctions with Bidding Constraints: A Game-Theoretic Analysis. Management Science, 26 (9). pp. 935-946. ISSN 0025-1909. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-094626115

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Abstract

This paper examines the existence and characterization of pure strategy Nash Equilibria in multiple-object auction games in which buyers face a binding constraint on exposure. There are five major results. First, symmetric Nash equilibria exist if and only if there are two or less buyers and two or less items. Second, a Nash equilibrium may not exist if the seller sets a positive reservation bid. Third, asymmetric solutions to symmetrically parameterized games typically involve "high-low" strategies: Each buyer submits positive bids only on some restricted subset of the items. Fourth, Nash equilibria typically generate zero "surplus" to the buyers. Fifth, when asymmetric solutions exist and the buyer are identical, these solutions are never unique.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2630438JSTORArticle
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.26.9.935DOIArticle
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171013-170452235Related ItemEarlier version published as Social Science Working Paper 290
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:© 1980, The Institute of Management Sciences. Received October 1979. Published Online: September 1, 1980. The author gratefully acknowledges helpful comments on earlier drafts by Kim Border, Ronald Braeutigam, Robert Forsythe and Roger Noll.
Subject Keywords:games, bidding
Issue or Number:9
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-094626115
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-094626115
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:64991
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Susan Vite
Deposited On:09 Mar 2016 18:56
Last Modified:22 Nov 2019 09:58

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