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An Experimental Examination of Auction Mechanisms for Discrete Public Goods

Ferejohn, John A. and Forsythe, Robert and Noll, Roger G. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1982) An Experimental Examination of Auction Mechanisms for Discrete Public Goods. In: Research in Experimental Economics. Vol.2. JAI Press , Greenwich, Conn, pp. 175-199. ISBN 9780892322633.

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[Introduction] In previous research (Ferejohn et al., 1976, 1977, 1979a, 1979b) we have addressed the problem of designing well-behaved choice mechanisms for simultaneously purchasing more than one discrete public good from among several independent alternatives. A "discrete public good" is a public good which is provided in a single, fixed quantity. The initial example that motivated our work (see Ferejohn et al., 1976) was the selection of roughly 30 television programs of fixed duration and content from more than 100 programs that were proposed to public television stations. Several other examples are equally germane, such as the selection of research proposals to be supported by a foundation or the decision by partners in a joint oil exploration venture as to the tracts in a field on which to bid. In practice, most collective decisions are posed as a choice among discrete alternatives to simplify the selection process. See Ferejohn et al. (1979b) for more examples.

Item Type:Book Section
Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:© 1982 JAI Press Inc.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
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Social Science Working Paper262
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-095511103
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:64993
Deposited On:09 Mar 2016 23:44
Last Modified:22 Nov 2019 09:58

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