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Private incentives in social dilemmas: The effects of incomplete information and altruism

Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (1988) Private incentives in social dilemmas: The effects of incomplete information and altruism. Journal of Public Economics, 35 (3). pp. 309-332. ISSN 0047-2727. http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-102157237

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the provision of discrete public goods when individuals have altruistic preferences which others do not precisely know. The problem is formulated and solved as a Bayesian game. In contrast to standard social psychological approaches, based on such natural language terms as greed, fear, and trust, the Bayesian approach provides a rigorous mathematical treatment of social participation. This theory is shown to make strong testable predictions that can integrate data collected across a wide variety of natural and experimental settings. The altruism model is shown to be supported by existing experimental data on binary voluntary contribution games.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(88)90035-7DOIArticle
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0047272788900357PublisherArticle
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170907-151800608Related ItemWorking Paper
Additional Information:© 1988 Elsevier B.V. Received December 1985, revised version received March 1988. Both authors gratefully acknowledge support from the National Science Foundation. Professor Palfrey also wishes to thank the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and the Exxon Education Foundation for their financial support. We benefited from comments from the referees and from seminar participants at Stanford University, University of Texas at Austin and Washington University.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
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NSFUNSPECIFIED
Alfred P. Sloan FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Exxon Education FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-102157237
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-102157237
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:65001
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Susan Vite
Deposited On:09 Mar 2016 23:07
Last Modified:08 Sep 2017 20:20

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