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A Strategic Calculus of Voting

Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (1983) A Strategic Calculus of Voting. Public Choice, 41 (1). pp. 7-53. ISSN 0048-5829. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-110552693

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Abstract

Presents a game-theoretic model of voter turnout, which features voting over two fixed alternatives as in a two-candidate election or in a referendum or initiative. Behavior of voters; Assumptions on the cost of voting against its potential benefits; Investigation on voting probabilities and the turnout decisions; Analysis of voting as a participation game.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00124048DOIArticle
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00124048UNSPECIFIEDArticle
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:© 1983 Mortinus Nijholf Publishers. Copyright of Public Choice is the property of Springer Science & Business Media B.V.. We have benented from discussion with Peter Coughlin, Terry Levesque, Peter Ordechook, Steve Salop, and participants in the Conference. This work was supported by National Science Foundation grant DAR-7917576. We thank Glenn Benson for preparing the computer graphics and Kathy Bagwell for processing the manuscript.
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Funding AgencyGrant Number
NSFDAR-7917576
Issue or Number:1
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-110552693
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-110552693
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:65012
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Susan Vite
Deposited On:10 Mar 2016 23:54
Last Modified:22 Nov 2019 09:58

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