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Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty

Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (1985) Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty. American Political Science Review, 79 (1). pp. 62-78. ISSN 0003-0554. doi:10.2307/1956119.

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The paradox of not voting is examined in a model where voters have uncertainty about the preferences and costs of other voters. In game-theoretic models of voter participation under complete information, equilibrium outcomes can have substantial turnout even when voting costs are relatively high. In contrast, when uncertainty about preferences and costs is present, only voters with negligible or negative net voting costs participate when the electorate is large.

Item Type:Article
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Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:© 1985 American Political Science Association. Received December 8, 1983. Revised May 11, 1984. Accepted July 3, 1984. Our debt to Ledyard's work should be obvious. We wish to thank Ed Green and Morgan Kousser for helpful discussions, and an anonymous referee for useful comments. This work was initiated while Rosenthal was a Sharman Fairchild Distinguished Scholar at the California Institute of Technology.
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Sherman Fairchild FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Issue or Number:1
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-112114151
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Official Citation: Thomas R. Palfrey and Howard Rosenthal (1985). Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty . American Political Science Review, 79, pp 62-78. doi:10.2307/1956119.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:65017
Deposited By: Susan Vite
Deposited On:11 Mar 2016 00:41
Last Modified:10 Nov 2021 23:38

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