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The approximation of efficient public good mechanisms by simple voting schemes

Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2002) The approximation of efficient public good mechanisms by simple voting schemes. Journal of Public Economics, 83 (2). pp. 153-171. ISSN 0047-2727. doi:10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00161-4.

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This paper compares the performance of simple voting rules, called referenda, to the performance of interim efficient mechanisms for the provision of a public good. In a referendum, voters simply vote for or against the provision of the public good, and production of the public good depends on whether or not the number of yes votes exceeds a prespecified threshold. Costs are shared equally. We show that in large populations for any interim efficient allocation rule, there exists a corresponding referendum that yields approximately the same total welfare when there are many individuals. Moreover, if there is a common value component to the voters’ preferences, then there is a unique approximating referendum.

Item Type:Article
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URLURL TypeDescription ItemWorking Paper
Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:© 2002 Elsevier. Received 29 March 2000; accepted 9 September 2000. This is a revision of a paper entitled ‘Voting is Approximately Optimal.’ We are grateful for the support of the National Science Foundation and of the New Millennium Program of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASA. The second author is grateful for the hospitality and research support at LEI-CREST. We thank two anonymous referees for their comments.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Centre de Recherche en Economie et STatistique (CREST)UNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:Public goods; Interim efficiency; Voting; Simple mechanisms
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Other Numbering System NameOther Numbering System ID
Social Science Working Paper1092
Issue or Number:2
Classification Code:JEL classification D61; D82; H41
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-152243404
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Official Citation:John O. Ledyard, Thomas R. Palfrey, The approximation of efficient public good mechanisms by simple voting schemes, Journal of Public Economics, Volume 83, Issue 2, February 2002, Pages 153-171, ISSN 0047-2727, (
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:65044
Deposited On:18 Mar 2016 17:55
Last Modified:10 Nov 2021 23:39

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