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Testing for Effects of Cheap Talk in a Public Goods Game with Private Information

Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (1991) Testing for Effects of Cheap Talk in a Public Goods Game with Private Information. Games and Economic Behavior, 3 (2). pp. 183-220. ISSN 0899-8256. doi:10.1016/0899-8256(91)90022-7.

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We investigate a game where player endowments are private information. If two of the three players contribute their endowments, a “public” benefit is paid to all three players. In one treatment, there is a single move with simultaneous decisions. In a second, cheap talk treatment, players may send binary messages prior to the decision move. Experimental data strongly support the equilibrium model for the first treatment. The results are mixed for the cheap talk treatment. While subjects condition heavily on the messages they receive, message behavior is less systematic.

Item Type:Article
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Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:© 1991 Elsevier. Received January 3, 1989. This research was supported by the National Science Foundation through Grants IST84062, SES-8608118, and SES-8511088. The first author also acknowledges the support and hospitality of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences during the 1986–1987 academic year. We have benefited from comments by participants of seminars at Carnegie-Mellon, Stanford, USC, and UCLA, and also wish to acknowledge a number of helpful discussions with Joseph Farrell, Reid Hastie, John Ledyard, and Amnon Rapoport. We thank Peng Lian, Mark Olson, and Giovanna Prennushi for research assistance.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
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Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral SciencesUNSPECIFIED
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Social Science Working Paper692c
Issue or Number:2
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-154429739
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Official Citation:Thomas R Palfrey, Howard Rosenthal, Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 3, Issue 2, May 1991, Pages 183-220, ISSN 0899-8256, (
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:65056
Deposited On:05 Mar 2016 00:50
Last Modified:10 Nov 2021 23:39

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