CaltechAUTHORS
  A Caltech Library Service

Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement

Cramton, Peter C. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1995) Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement. Games and Economic Behavior, 10 (2). pp. 255-283. ISSN 0899-8256. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-155150772

[img] PDF (sswp 731 - published) - Published Version
Restricted to Caltech community only
See Usage Policy.

1MB

Use this Persistent URL to link to this item: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-155150772

Abstract

In a mechanism design problem, participation constraints require that all types prefer the proposed mechanism to some status quo. If equilibrium play in the status quo mechanism depends on the players' beliefs, then the inference drawn if someone objects to the proposed mechanism may alter the participation constraints. We investigate this issue by modeling the mechanism design problem as a two-stage process, consisting of a ratification state followed by the actual play of the chosen game. We develop and illustrate a new concept, ratifiability, that takes account of inferences from a veto in a consistent way.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1032DOIArticle
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825685710329PublisherArticle
https://www.hss.caltech.edu/content/ratifiable-mechanisms-learning-disagreementOrganizationDiscussion Paper
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171130-140721592Related ItemSSWP 731
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:© 1995 Academic Press. Received March 26, 1991. We thank Jeff Banks, Steve Matthews, Preston McAfee, Joel Sobel, numerous seminar participants, and two referees for valuable comments. We are grateful tot he National Science Foundation for financial support. The first author thanks the Hoover Institution of Stanford University for a most enjoyable year as a National Fellow. Formerly SSWP 731.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
NSFUNSPECIFIED
Hoover InstitutionUNSPECIFIED
Other Numbering System:
Other Numbering System NameOther Numbering System ID
Social Science Working Paper731
Issue or Number:2
Classification Code:Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C700, C780, D820
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-155150772
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-155150772
Official Citation:Peter C. Cramton, Thomas R. Palfrey, Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 10, Issue 2, August 1995, Pages 255-283, ISSN 0899-8256, http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1032. (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825685710329)
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:65059
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Susan Vite
Deposited On:05 Mar 2016 00:25
Last Modified:22 Nov 2019 09:58

Repository Staff Only: item control page