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Anomalous Behavior in Linear Public Goods Experiments: How Much and why?

Palfrey, Thomas R. and Prisbrey, Jeffrey E. (1997) Anomalous Behavior in Linear Public Goods Experiments: How Much and why? American Economic Review, 87 (5). pp. 829-846. ISSN 0002-8282.

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We report the results of voluntary contributions experiments where subjects are randomly assigned different rates of return from their private consumption. These random assignments are changed round to round, enabling the measurement of individual player contribution rates as a function of that player's investment cost. We directly test these response functions for the presence of warm-glow and/or altruism effects. We find significant evidence for heterogeneous warm-glow effects that are, on average, low in magnitude. We statistically reject the presence of an altruism effect.

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Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:© 1997 American Economic Association. The financial support of the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Roger Gordon. R. Mark Isaac, John Ledyard, Jimmy Walker, Nat Wilcox, and four other referees for offering helpful suggestions and comments. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the California Institute of Technology or the Federal Communications Commission.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
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Social Science Working Paper833
Issue or Number:5
Classification Code:JEL C92, H41
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-134207071
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Official Citation:Palfrey, Thomas R., and Jeffrey E. Prisbrey. 1997. “Anomalous Behavior in Public Goods Experiments: How Much and Why?”. The American Economic Review 87 (5). American Economic Association: 829–46.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:65130
Deposited On:10 Mar 2016 00:05
Last Modified:22 Nov 2019 09:58

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