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In or out?: Centralization by majority vote

Crémer, Jacques and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1996) In or out?: Centralization by majority vote. European Economic Review, 40 (1). pp. 43-60. ISSN 0014-2921. doi:10.1016/0014-2921(95)00053-4.

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We present a positive theory of centralization of political decisions. Voters choose centralization or decentralization depending on their forecast of the political organization that will favor the policies they prefer. We study the induced preferences for centralization as well results of different forms of referenda.

Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription ItemWorking Paper
Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:© 1996 Elsevier Science B.V. Acknowledgements: Cremer's research was supported in part by a grant to the GREMAQ from the Commissariat au Plan under the auspices of the initiative finalisee 'Enjeux et Procedures de la Decentralisation'.
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Groupe de Recherche en Économie Mathématique et Quantitative (GREMAQ)UNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:Subsidiarity; Voting; Federalism; Centralization; Secession
Issue or Number:1
Classification Code:JEL classification: D72; H11; H70
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-141704583
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:65143
Deposited On:14 Dec 2016 00:17
Last Modified:10 Nov 2021 23:40

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