Crémer, Jacques and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1996) In or out?: Centralization by majority vote. European Economic Review, 40 (1). pp. 43-60. ISSN 0014-2921. doi:10.1016/0014-2921(95)00053-4. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-141704583
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Abstract
We present a positive theory of centralization of political decisions. Voters choose centralization or decentralization depending on their forecast of the political organization that will favor the policies they prefer. We study the induced preferences for centralization as well results of different forms of referenda.
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Additional Information: | © 1996 Elsevier Science B.V. Acknowledgements: Cremer's research was supported in part by a grant to the GREMAQ from the Commissariat au Plan under the auspices of the initiative finalisee 'Enjeux et Procedures de la Decentralisation'. | ||||||||||||
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Subject Keywords: | Subsidiarity; Voting; Federalism; Centralization; Secession | ||||||||||||
Issue or Number: | 1 | ||||||||||||
Classification Code: | JEL classification: D72; H11; H70 | ||||||||||||
DOI: | 10.1016/0014-2921(95)00053-4 | ||||||||||||
Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-141704583 | ||||||||||||
Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-141704583 | ||||||||||||
Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||||||||
ID Code: | 65143 | ||||||||||||
Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||||||||
Deposited By: | INVALID USER | ||||||||||||
Deposited On: | 14 Dec 2016 00:17 | ||||||||||||
Last Modified: | 10 Nov 2021 23:40 |
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