A Caltech Library Service

Agendas, Strategic Voting, and Signaling with Incomplete Information

Ordeshook, Peter C. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1988) Agendas, Strategic Voting, and Signaling with Incomplete Information. American Journal of Political Science, 32 (2). pp. 441-466. ISSN 0092-5853. doi:10.2307/2111131.

Full text is not posted in this repository. Consult Related URLs below.

Use this Persistent URL to link to this item:


The literature on agendas with sincere and strategic voting represents an important contribution to our understanding of committees, of institutions, and of the opportunities to manipulate outcomes by the manipulation of institutions. That literature, though, imposes an assumption that may be unrealistic in many situations; namely, that everyone knows the preferences of everyone else. In this essay we apply Bayesian equilibrium analysis to show that the properties of agendas that others derive by assuming complete information do not hold necessarily under incomplete information. First, a Condorcet winner need not be selected, even if nearly everyone on the committee most prefers it. Second, the "two-step theorem," that any outcome reachable in n voting stages via some amendment agenda is reachable in two stages under sophisticated voting, need not hold. Third, nonbinding votes, such as straw polls, can critically affect final outcomes.

Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:© 1988 Midwest Political Science Association. Manuscript submitted 29 May 1986. Final manuscript received 26 February 1987. This research was supported by National Science Foundation grants to Carnegie-Mellon University and to the University of Texas at Austin. We also wish to acknowledge the helpful suggestions of Howard Rosenthal, John Aldrich, Jeffrey Banks, Richard McKelvey, and Nicholas Miller, and in the case of one author, the support of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford University.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Stanford UniversityUNSPECIFIED
Other Numbering System:
Other Numbering System NameOther Numbering System ID
Social Science Working Paper618c
Issue or Number:2
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-150818295
Persistent URL:
Official Citation:Ordeshook, Peter C., and Thomas R. Palfrey. 1988. “Agendas, Strategic Voting, and Signaling with Incomplete Information”. American Journal of Political Science 32 (2). [Midwest Political Science Association, Wiley]: 441–66. doi:10.2307/2111131.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:65151
Deposited By: Susan Vite
Deposited On:06 Apr 2016 23:25
Last Modified:10 Nov 2021 23:40

Repository Staff Only: item control page