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Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining

Jackson, Matthew O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1998) Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining. Econometrica, 66 (6). pp. 1353-1388. ISSN 1468-0262.

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We examine a simple bargaining setting where heterogeneous buyers and sellers are repeatedly matched with each other. We begin by characterizing efficiency in such a dynamic setting, and discuss how it differs from efficiency in a centralized static setting. We then study the allocations which can result in equilibrium when the matched buyers and sellers bargain through some extensive game form. We take an implementation approach, characterizing the possible allocation rules which result as the extensive game form is varied. We are particularly concerned with the impact of making trade voluntary: imposing individual rationality on and off the equilibrium path. No buyer or seller consummates an agreement which leaves them worse off than the discounted expected value of their future rematching in the market. Finally, we compare and contrast the efficient allocations with those that could ever arise as the equilibria of some voluntary negotiation procedure.

Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription ItemWorking Paper
Jackson, Matthew O.0000-0001-9846-4249
Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:© 1998 The Econometric Society. This project was initiated while Jackson was visiting the California Institute of Technology and continued while he was at Northwestern University and while Palfrey was visiting CREST-LEI and CERAS; we are grateful for their support. We are also grateful for financial support provided under NSF Grant SBR-9507912. We thank Nabil Al-Najjar, Larry Ausubel, Eddie DFekel, Ray Deneckere, Larry Jones, Dilip Mookherjee, Mike Peters, Larry Samuelson, and Asher Wolinsky for helpful conversations and suggestions. We have benefited from the careful comments and suggestions of an editor and three anonymous referees on an earlier draft.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Centre de Recherche en Economie et STatistique (CREST)UNSPECIFIED
Centre de recherche et d'action sociales (CERAS)UNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:Bargaining; implementation; matching
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Other Numbering System NameOther Numbering System ID
Social Science Working Paper985
Issue or Number:6
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-163746656
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Official Citation:Jackson, Matthew O., and Thomas R. Palfrey. 1998. “Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining”. Econometrica 66 (6). [Wiley, Econometric Society]: 1353–88. doi:10.2307/2999620.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:65162
Deposited By: Susan Vite
Deposited On:18 Mar 2016 23:16
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 09:44

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