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Equilibrium in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data

Erikson, Robert S. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2000) Equilibrium in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data. American Political Science Review, 94 (3). pp. 595-609. ISSN 0003-0554. doi:10.2307/2585833.

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We present a formal game-theoretic model to explain the simultaneity problem that makes it difficult to obtain unbiased estimates of the effects of both incumbent and challenger spending in U.S. House elections. The model predicts a particular form of correlation between the expected closeness of the race and the level of spending by both candidates, which implies that the simultaneity problem should not be present in close races and should be progressively more severe in the range of safe races that are empirically observed. This is confirmed by comparing simple OLS regression of races that are expected to be close with races that are not, using House incumbent races spanning two decades.

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Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:© 2000 American Political Science Association. The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the National Science Foundation, grant numbers SES-9224787 and SES-9223868. We thank Jeffrey Banks, Jonathan Katz, D. Roderick Kiewiet, David Romero, four anonymous referees, and the APSR Editor for helpful comments.
Issue or Number:3
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-164353192
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Official Citation: Robert S. Erikson and Thomas R. Palfrey (2000). Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data . American Political Science Review, 94, pp 595-609. doi:10.2307/2585833.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:65164
Deposited On:18 Mar 2016 00:05
Last Modified:10 Nov 2021 23:41

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