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Federal Mandates with Local Agenda Setters

Crémer, Jacques and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2002) Federal Mandates with Local Agenda Setters. Review of Economic Design, 7 (3). pp. 279-296. ISSN 1434-4742. doi:10.1007/s100580200078.

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This paper investigates the effect of local monopoly agenda setting on federal standards. Federal standards specify a minimum (or maximum) point in policy space which can be raised (or lowered) by local option. Without local agenda setters, this creates incentives for nonmajoritarian outcomes, with a tendency for policies to be too high (low). Local agenda setters may have incentives to distort these outcomes even further. We demonstrate that federal standards can counterbalance the distortions of local agenda setters.

Item Type:Article
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URLURL TypeDescription ReadCube access
Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:© 2002 Springer. We wish to thank LEESP, CNRS, and NSF for financial support. The paper has benefitted from helpful comments by Andy Postlewaite, Howard Rosenthal, Norman Schofield, and an anonymous referee.
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political ScienceUNSPECIFIED
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)UNSPECIFIED
Issue or Number:3
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-103936514
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Official Citation:Crémer, J. & Palfrey, T. Rev Econ Design (2002) 7: 279.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:65192
Deposited By: Susan Vite
Deposited On:17 Mar 2016 23:34
Last Modified:10 Nov 2021 23:41

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