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Efficient Equilibria in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism with Private Information

Laussel, Didier and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2002) Efficient Equilibria in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism with Private Information. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 5 (3). pp. 449-478. ISSN 1097-3923. doi:10.1111/1467-9779.00143. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-110526874

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Abstract

We characterize generally the Bayesian Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions public goods game for two consumers with private information.The two consumers simultaneously make voluntary contributions to the public good, and the contributions are refunded if the total falls short of the cost of the public good. Several families of equilibria (step-function, regular and semi-regular) are studied. Necessary and sufficient conditions for regular and semi-regular equilibrium allocations to be interim incentive efficient are derived. In the uniform distribution case we prove (i) the existence of an open set of incentive efficient regular equilibria when the cost of production is large enough and (ii) the existence of an open set of incentive efficient semi-regular equilibria when the cost of production is low enough. Step-function equilibra are proved to be interim incentive inefficient.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9779.00143DOIArticle
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9779.00143/abstractPublisherArticle
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:© 2003 Blackwell Publishing, Inc. Received January 2000; Accepted January 2001. We thank Myrna Wooders and two referees for many helpful comments. The second author is grateful for the financial support of GREQAM and University of Aix-Marseilles 2 during his visit in Spring 1999, and also the financial support of the National Science Foundation
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille (GREQAM)UNSPECIFIED
University of Aix-Marseilles 2UNSPECIFIED
NSFUNSPECIFIED
Issue or Number:3
DOI:10.1111/1467-9779.00143
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-110526874
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-110526874
Official Citation:Laussel, D. and Palfrey, T. R. (2003), Efficient Equilibria in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism with Private Information. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 5: 449–478. doi: 10.1111/1467-9779.00143
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:65193
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Susan Vite
Deposited On:17 Mar 2016 23:40
Last Modified:10 Nov 2021 23:41

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