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The Holdout Game: An Experimental Study of an Infinitely Repeated Game with Two-Sided Incomplete Information

McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1995) The Holdout Game: An Experimental Study of an Infinitely Repeated Game with Two-Sided Incomplete Information. In: Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics. International Symposia in Economic Theory and Econometrics. Cambridge University Press , New York, NY, pp. 321-349. ISBN 9780521443401.

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This paper investigates a two-person infinitely repeated game of incomplete information in which both players have private information on their individual type before the first game is played; this initial private information is followed by an infinite sequence if identical simultaneous-move stage games. Players observe their own payoff and the other player's move after each stage game has been played. Payoffs in the game are given by the discounted sum of payoffs in all the stage games.

Item Type:Book Section
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Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:© 1995 Cambridge University Press. This research was supported in part by National Science Foundation grant no. SES-9011828 to the California Institute of Technology. We wish to thank Michael Fey, Daniel Kim, Janice Lau, Jessie McReynolds, and Jeff Prisbrey for research assistance. Comments by participants in the June 1992 meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare (Caen, France) are gratefully acknowledged. The data for the experiment are available from the authors on request.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
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Social Science Working Paper804
Series Name:International Symposia in Economic Theory and Econometrics
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-113638069
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:65195
Deposited On:16 Mar 2016 21:38
Last Modified:22 Nov 2019 09:58

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