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Electoral Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information

Palfrey, Thomas R. and Aragones, Enriqueta (2005) Electoral Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information. In: Social Choice and Strategic Behavior: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey Scot Banks. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer , New York, NY, pp. 93-112. ISBN 978-3540220534.

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This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have policy preferences. There is two-dimensional private information. Candidate ideal points as well as their tradeoffs between policy preferences and winning are private information. The distribution of this two-dimensional type is common knowledge. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, with a distribution that is commonly known by both candidates. Pure strategy equilibria always exist in this model. We characterize the effects of increased uncertainty about the median voter, the effect of candidate policy preferences, and the effects of changes in the distribution of private information. We prove that the distribution of candidate policies approaches the mixed equilibrium of Aragones and Palfrey [2], when both candidates' weights on policy preferences go to zero.

Item Type:Book Section
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Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:© 2005 Springer. Aragones acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology, grant number SEC2000-1186. Palfrey acknowledges financial support from the National Science Foundation grant number SES-0079301, and from the Institut d'Anàlsi Econòmica. He is also grateful for the hospitality of IAE in May 2003. We thank Clara Ponsati and participants of several seminars for helpful comments.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
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Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (MCyT)SEC2000-1186
Institut d'Anàlsi EconòmicaUNSPECIFIED
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Social Science Working Paper1169
Series Name:Studies in Choice and Welfare
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-114044999
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:65196
Deposited On:17 Mar 2016 21:33
Last Modified:10 Nov 2021 23:41

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