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What do Notaries do? Overcoming Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets: The Case of Paris, 1751

Hoffman, Philip T. and Postel-Vinay, Gilles and Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent (1998) What do Notaries do? Overcoming Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets: The Case of Paris, 1751. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 154 (3). pp. 449-530. ISSN 0932-4569 . http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-141953110

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Abstract

Using evidence from 18th century Paris, we explore how financial intermediaries resolved problems of asymmetric information in financial markets. The Parisian intermediaries were notaries, and after examining their role in asset markets, we develop a more general model of intermediaries' behavior and then test the model using a rich set of data from Paris. Institutions for disseminating information insured that intermediaries provided high quality service, and such institutions were central to the growth of asset markets in pre-industrial Europe.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40752087JSTORArticle
Additional Information:© 1998 Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG.
Other Numbering System:
Other Numbering System NameOther Numbering System ID
UCLA Dept. of Economics Working Paper719
Classification Code:JEL D23, D82, G29, N23
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-141953110
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-141953110
Official Citation:Hoffman, Philip T., Gilles Postel-Vinay, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal. 1998. “What Do Notaries Do? Overcoming Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets: The Case of Paris, 1751”. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) / Zeitschrift Für Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft 154 (3). Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG: 499–530. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40752087.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:65218
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Susan Vite
Deposited On:10 Mar 2016 20:19
Last Modified:10 Mar 2016 20:19

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