A Caltech Library Service

Political Reputations and Campaign Promises

Aragones, Enriqueta and Palfrey, Thomas R. and Postlewaite, Andrew (2006) Political Reputations and Campaign Promises. Social Science Working Paper, 1258. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA.

[img] PDF (sswp 1258 - Dec. 2006) - Accepted Version
See Usage Policy.


Use this Persistent URL to link to this item:


We analyze conditions under which candidates’ reputations may affect the beliefs of the voters over what policy will be implemented by the winning candidate of an election. We develop a model of repeated elections with complete information in which candidates are purely ideological. We analyze an equilibrium in which voters’ strategies involve a credible threat to punish candidates who renege of their campaign promises, and all campaign promises are believed by voters, and honored by candidates. We characterize the maximal credible campaign promises and obtain that the degree to which promises are credible in equilibrium is an increasing function of the value of a candidate’s reputation.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription ItemArticle
Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:July 2006. Added to SSWP Dec. 2006. Acknowledgments: Palfrey and Postlewaite acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation. Aragonès acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology, grant SEC2003-01961, CREA-Barcelona Economics, and the hospitality of CBRSS at Harvard University. Palfrey thanks the Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica for its hospitality in Spring 2003. This paper is part of the PAC Project CIT-2-CT-2004-506084 funded by the European Commission. We thank Alberto Alesina, Abhijit Banerjee, Orit Kedar, Steve Matthews, and participants of the Workshop on Positive Political Economy at CBRSS (Harvard University). We also thank Roberto Perotti and three referees for helpful comments that improved this paper.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Spanish Ministry of Science and TechnologySEC2003-01961
CREA-Barcelona EconomicsUNSPECIFIED
European Commission. PAC ProjectCIT-2-CT-2004-506084
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1258
Classification Code:JEL: D8
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160314-151357281
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:65339
Deposited By: Katherine Johnson
Deposited On:14 Mar 2016 22:23
Last Modified:22 Nov 2019 09:58

Repository Staff Only: item control page