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Equilibrium Effects in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data

Erickson, Robert S. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2000) Equilibrium Effects in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data. American Political Science Review, 94 (3). pp. 595-609. ISSN 0003-0554. http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160314-165039438

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Abstract

We present a formal game-theoretic model to explain the simultaneity problem that makes it difficult to obtain unbiased estimates of the effects of both incumbent and challenger spending in U.S. House elections. The model predicts a particular form of correlation between the expected closeness of the race and the level of spending by both candidates, which implies that the simultaneity problem should not be present in close races and should be progressively more severe in the range of safe races that are empirically observed. This is confirmed by comparing simple OLS regression of races that are expected to be close with races that are not, using House incumbent races spanning two decades.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2585833DOIArticle
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2585833JSTORArticle
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170814-154504840Related ItemWorking Paper
Alternate Title:Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data
Additional Information:© American Political Science Association 2000. Added to SSWP May 1, 1997. The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the National Science Foundation, grant numbers SES-9224787 and SES-9223868. We thank Jeffrey Banks, Jonathan Katz, D. Roderick Kiewiet, David Romero, four anonymous referees, and the APSR Editor for helpful comments.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
NSFSES-9224787
NSFSES-9223868
Subject Keywords:campaign spending; game theory; elections; incumbency
Other Numbering System:
Other Numbering System NameOther Numbering System ID
Social Science Working Paper1006
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160314-165039438
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160314-165039438
Official Citation: Robert S. Erikson and Thomas R. Palfrey (2000). Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data. American Political Science Review, 94, pp 595-609. doi:10.2307/2585833.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:65343
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Katherine Johnson
Deposited On:15 Mar 2016 00:08
Last Modified:14 Aug 2017 22:55

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