The Banks set and the Uncovered Set in budget allocation problems

Dutta, Bhaskar and Jackson, Matthew O. and Le Breton, Michel (2005) The Banks set and the Uncovered Set in budget allocation problems. In: Social Choice and Strategic Behavior: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey Scot Banks. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer , New York, NY, pp. 163-199. ISBN 978-3540220534. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160317-143414501

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Abstract

We examine how a society chooses to divide a given budget among various regions, projects or individuals. In particular, we characterize the Banks set and the Uncovered Set in such problems. We show that the two sets can be proper subsets of the set of all alternatives, and at times are very pointed in their predictions. This contrasts with well-known "chaos theorems," which suggest that majority voting does not lead to any meaningful predictions when the policy space is multidimensional.

Item Type:

Book Section

Related URLs:

URL	URL Type	Description
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-27295-X_7	DOI	Chapter
http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F3-540-27295-X_7	Publisher	Chapter
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171102-145748198	Related Item	Earlier version published as Social Science Working Paper 1195

ORCID:

Author	ORCID
Jackson, Matthew O.	0000-0001-9846-4249

Additional Information:

© 2005 Springer. This paper was written in fond memory of our dear friend and colleague Jeffrey Scot Banks. Financial support under NSF grant SES-0316493 is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Salvador Barbera for helpful conversations that helped spark some of the ideas behind the model we develop here, and David Austen-Smith for detailed comments on an earlier draft.

Group:

Social Science Working Papers

Funders:

Funding Agency	Grant Number
NSF	SES-0316493

Series Name:

Studies in Choice and Welfare

Record Number:

CaltechAUTHORS:20160317-143414501

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https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160317-143414501

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No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.

ID Code:

65454

Collection:

CaltechAUTHORS

Deposited By:

George Porter

Deposited On:

18 Mar 2016 17:13

Last Modified:

03 Oct 2019 09:47

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