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An Experimental Study of Decentralized Matching

Echenique, Federico and Yariv, Leeat (2012) An Experimental Study of Decentralized Matching. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160321-133051578

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Abstract

We present an experimental study of complex decentralized one-to-one matching markets, such as labor or marriage markets. In our experiments, subjects are informed of everyone's preferences and can make arbitrary non-binding match offers that are realized only when a certain period of market inactivity has elapsed. We find three main results. First, stable matches are the prevalent outcome. Second, in markets with multiple stable matches, the median stable match is selected most frequently. Third, the cardinal representation of ordinal preferences substantially impacts which stable match gets selected. Furthermore, the endogenous dynamic paths that lead to stability exhibit several persistent features.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Echenique, Federico0000-0002-1567-6770
Additional Information:August 17, 2012. We thank Drew Fudenberg, Jacob Goeree, Matthew Jackson, Muriel Niederle, Charles Plott, Andrew Schotter, and Alistair Wilson for useful conversations and suggestions. Gabriel Katz and Erik Madsen provided us with superb research assistance. Financial support from the National Science Foundation (SES 0963583) and the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
NSFSES-0963583
Gordon and Betty Moore FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:Decentralized Matching, Experiments, Market Design
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160321-133051578
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160321-133051578
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:65543
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Susan Vite
Deposited On:22 Mar 2016 21:13
Last Modified:26 Nov 2019 11:15

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