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Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching

Echenique, Federico and Galichon, Alfred (2013) Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching. Social Science Working Papers, 1372. , Pasadena, California. (Submitted)

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We characterize solutions for two-sided matching, both in the transferable- and in the nontransferable-utility frameworks, using a cardinal formulation. Our approach makes the comparison of the matching models with and without transfers particularly transparent. We introduce the concept of a no-trade matching to study the role of transfers in matching. A no-trade matching is one in which the availability of transfers do not affect the outcome.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription ItemPublished Article
Echenique, Federico0000-0002-1567-6770
Additional Information:This research has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC grant agreement n 313699. Support from FiME, Laboratoire de Finance des Marchés de l'Energie ( is gratefully acknowledged.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
European Research Council (ERC)313699
Laboratoire de Finance des Marchés de l'EnergieUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:Stable matching; Afriat's Theorem; Gale and Shapley; Assignment game
Other Numbering System:
Other Numbering System NameOther Numbering System ID
Social Science Working Papers1372
Series Name:Social Science Working Papers
Issue or Number:1372
Classification Code:JEL: C71, C78
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160321-134222786
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:65546
Deposited By: Susan Vite
Deposited On:22 Mar 2016 21:07
Last Modified:26 Nov 2019 11:15

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