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The Core Matchings of Markets with Transfers

Chambers, Christopher P. and Echenique, Federico (2008) The Core Matchings of Markets with Transfers. Social Science Working Paper, 1298. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, California.

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We characterize the structure of the set of core matchings of an assignment game (a two-sided market with transfers). Such a set satisfies a property we call consistency. Consistency of a set of matchings states that, for any matching v, if, for each agent i there exists a matching μ in the set for which μ(i) = v(i), then v is in the set. A set of matchings satisfies consistency if and only if there is an assignment game for which all elements of the set maximize the surplus. We also identify conditions under which we can assume the assignment game has nonnegative values.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription ItemJournal article
Chambers, Christopher P.0000-0001-8253-0328
Echenique, Federico0000-0002-1567-6770
Additional Information:October 2008. We are grateful to Kim Border for explaining the integer/real version of Farkas' Lemma, and to Haluk Ergin for his detailed comments. We also thank Guilherme de Freitas and Sang Mok Lee for excellent research assistance. Our research was supported by the National Science Foundation through grant SES-0751980.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Subject Keywords:Matching, Testable Implications, Coalition Formation
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1298
Classification Code:JEL C61,C71
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160321-141503758
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:65554
Deposited On:22 Mar 2016 20:43
Last Modified:09 Mar 2020 13:18

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