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Money in Judicial Politics: Individual Contributions and Collective Decisions

Iaryczower, Matias and Shum, Matthew (2013) Money in Judicial Politics: Individual Contributions and Collective Decisions. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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We study how campaign contributions affect the voting strategies and effectiveness of justices in the Supreme Court of eight US states. A judge's voting strategy leans more heavily towards an interest group the larger are its contributions to the judge, and the smaller are its contributions to other members of the court. This indirect effect is consistent with an equilibrium adjustment to contributions to other members of the court. Observed contributions have a large effect on the behavior of individual judges - affecting both the probability that they vote to overturn a decision of the lower court and the probability that they support an incorrect decision - but they have a small effect on the decisions and effectiveness of the Court.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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URLURL TypeDescription paper
Shum, Matthew0000-0002-6262-915X
Additional Information:January 23, 2012. Updated October 3, 2013. We thank Juliana Bambaci, Claire Lim, Sanford Gordon, and participants at seminars at Yale, and the Political Institutions and Economic Policy, MPSA and AEA conferences, for useful comments. Financial support from NSF Grants SES-1061326 (Iaryczower) and SES-1061266 (Shum) is gratefully acknowledged.
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Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160329-105602711
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:65744
Deposited On:29 Mar 2016 23:11
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 09:50

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