A Caltech Library Service

The Value of Information in the Court. Get it Right, Keep it Tight

Iaryczower, Matias and Shum, Matthew (2010) The Value of Information in the Court. Get it Right, Keep it Tight. Social Science Working Paper, 1313R. California Institution of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

[img] PDF (sswp 1313 - Jul. 2010) - Accepted Version
See Usage Policy.


Use this Persistent URL to link to this item:


We estimate an equilibrium model of decision-making in the US Supreme Court which takes into account both private information and ideological differences between justices. We present a measure of the value of information in the court: the probability that a justice votes differently than what she would have voted for in the absence of case-specific information. Our results suggest a sizable value of information: in roughly 44% of cases, justices' initial leanings are changed by their personal assessments of the case. Our results also confirm the increased politicization of the Supreme Court in the last quarter century. We perform counterfactual simulations to draw implications for institutional design.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription ItemUpdated version published as journal article
Shum, Matthew0000-0002-6262-915X
Additional Information:September 2009. Revised July, 2010.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:Supreme Court, common values, strategic voting, mixture model
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1313R
Classification Code:JEL: D72, D78, C13
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160331-160352489
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:65820
Deposited By: Katherine Johnson
Deposited On:31 Mar 2016 23:14
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 09:50

Repository Staff Only: item control page