Xu, Yunjian and Li, Na and Low, Steven H. (2016) Demand Response With Capacity Constrained Supply Function Bidding. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 31 (2). pp. 1377-1394. ISSN 0885-8950. doi:10.1109/TPWRS.2015.2421932. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160408-101533727
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Abstract
We study the problem faced by an operator who aims to allocate a certain amount of load adjustment (either load reduction or increment) to multiple consumers so as to minimize the aggregate consumer disutility. We propose and analyze a simple uniform-price market mechanism where every consumer submits a single bid to choose a supply function from a group of parameterized ones. These parameterized supply functions are designed to ensure that every consumer's load adjustment is within an exogenous capacity limit that is determined by the current power system operating condition. We show that the proposed mechanism yields bounded efficiency loss at a Nash equilibrium. In particular, the proposed mechanism is shown to achieve approximate social optimality at a Nash equilibrium, if the total capacity limit excluding the consumer with the largest one is much larger than the total amount of load to be adjusted. We complement our analysis through numerical case studies.
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Additional Information: | © 2015 IEEE. Manuscript received October 07, 2014; revised January 06, 2015; accepted April 01, 2015; date of publication May 01, 2015; date of current version February 17, 2016. This work was supported in part by the MIT-SUTD International Design Center (IDC) under Grant IDG21400103, the National Science Foundation NetSE under Grant CNS 0911041, ARPA-E under Grant DE-AR0000226, Southern California Edison, National Science Council of Taiwan, R.O.C , under Grant NSC 101-3113-P-008-001, and the Resnick Institute . Paper no. TPWRS-01373-2014. | ||||||||||||||
Group: | Resnick Sustainability Institute | ||||||||||||||
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Subject Keywords: | Demand response; efficiency loss; game theory; Nash equilibrium; renewable generation | ||||||||||||||
Issue or Number: | 2 | ||||||||||||||
DOI: | 10.1109/TPWRS.2015.2421932 | ||||||||||||||
Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20160408-101533727 | ||||||||||||||
Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160408-101533727 | ||||||||||||||
Official Citation: | Y. Xu, N. Li and S. H. Low, "Demand Response With Capacity Constrained Supply Function Bidding," in IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 1377-1394, March 2016. doi: 10.1109/TPWRS.2015.2421932 | ||||||||||||||
Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||||||||||
ID Code: | 66017 | ||||||||||||||
Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||||||||||
Deposited By: | Melissa Ray | ||||||||||||||
Deposited On: | 12 Apr 2016 23:49 | ||||||||||||||
Last Modified: | 10 Nov 2021 23:52 |
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