A Caltech Library Service

A Battle-of-the-Sexes Game with Incomplete Information

Banks, Jeffrey S. and Calvert, Randall L. (1992) A Battle-of-the-Sexes Game with Incomplete Information. Games and Economic Behavior, 4 (3). pp. 347-372. ISSN 0899-8256. doi:10.1016/0899-8256(92)90044-S.

Full text is not posted in this repository. Consult Related URLs below.

Use this Persistent URL to link to this item:


A battle-of-the-sexes game with incomplete information presents two different efficiency problems: coordination, and maximizing ex ante expected utility by favoring a player facing high stakes. Communication and mediation can allow an optimal tradeoff between the two problems. This paper gives (1) necessary conditions for (and specification of) an incentive-efficient mediation mechanism and (2) necessary and sufficient conditions for mediation to be required for efficiency. These conditions yield additional results concerning the necessity of privacy in communications and the superfluity of enforcement. Contrary to some recent studies, our results demonstrate that unmediated communication is insufficient to achieve incentive efficiency. An application to the theory of regulation is suggested.

Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
Additional Information:© 1992 Elsevier. Received June 9, 1990. This research was supported by NSF Grant SES-8908226. The authors are grateful to two anonymous referees, and to workshop participants at Harvard University, the University of Illinois, the IMSSS, the University of Iowa, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the University of Rochester, Washington University in St. Louis, and the Hoover Institution, for helpful comments.
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Issue or Number:3
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-070914374
Persistent URL:
Official Citation:Jeffrey S Banks, Randall L Calvert, A battle-of-the-sexes game with incomplete information, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 4, Issue 3, 1992, Pages 347-372, ISSN 0899-8256, (
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:67278
Deposited By: Ruth Sustaita
Deposited On:24 May 2016 18:49
Last Modified:11 Nov 2021 00:30

Repository Staff Only: item control page