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Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios

Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey (1990) Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios. American Political Science Review, 84 (3). pp. 891-906. ISSN 0003-0554. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-105606489

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Abstract

Different members of coalition governments typically have responsibility for different aspects, or dimensions, of policy. Such responsibilities are allocated as portfolios to government members. Given a distribution of such portfolios, final government policy is derived as the accumulation of individual members' decisions in regard to their respective responsibilities. We develop a portfolio allocation model of government formation and policy decision in multiparty legislatures. In particular, we focus on stable portfolio allocations, where a stable allocation is one that yields a policy that no legislative coalition is willing or able to overturn. Several notions of stability are considered and related to the usual concept of the core. Among the results are that although stable allocations are not guaranteed, such allocations can exist with minority governments; and that final policy outcomes associated with stable governments need not be “centrist.“


Item Type:Article
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http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1962771DOIArticle
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1962771JSTORArticle
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=9208762PublisherArticle
Additional Information:© 1990 American Political Science Association. Financial support from the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
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Issue or Number:3
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-105606489
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-105606489
Official Citation:David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks (1990). Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios . American Political Science Review, 84, pp 891-906. doi:10.2307/1962771.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:67304
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Ruth Sustaita
Deposited On:24 May 2016 18:20
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 10:04

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