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Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes

Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey (1988) Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes. American Political Science Review, 82 (2). pp. 405-422. ISSN 0003-0554. doi:10.2307/1957393.

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Predictions of electoral behavior in a multiparty setting should be a function of the voters' beliefs about how parties will perform following an election. Similarly, party behavior in a legislature should be a function of electoral promises and rewards. We develop a multistage game-theoretic model of three-party competition under proportional representation. The final policy outcome of the game is generated by a noncooperative bargaining game between the parties in the elected legislature. This game is essentially defined by the vote shares each party receives in the general election, and the parties' electoral policy positions. At the electoral stage parties and voters are strategic in that they take account of the legislative implications of any electoral outcome. We solve for equilibrium electoral positions by the parties and final policy outcomes.

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Additional Information:© 1988 American Political Science Association. We would like to thank seminar participants at California Institute of Technology, the University of Rochester, and conferees at the International Conference on Coalition Theory and Public Choice, Fiesole, Italy, 1987 for comments and suggestions. Financial support of the National Science Foundation through grant SES-8700468 is gratefully acknowledged.
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Issue or Number:2
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-111234141
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Official Citation: David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks (1988). Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes. American Political Science Review, 82, pp 405-422. doi:10.2307/1957393.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:67307
Deposited By: Ruth Sustaita
Deposited On:24 May 2016 18:26
Last Modified:11 Nov 2021 00:30

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