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Monotonicity in Electoral Systems

Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey (1991) Monotonicity in Electoral Systems. American Political Science Review, 85 (2). pp. 531-537. ISSN 0003-0554. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-145834215

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Abstract

Much of the literature concerning the relative merits of alternative electoral rules is centered around the extent to which particular rules select "representative" legislatures. And an important concern in evaluating the "representativeness" of an electoral rule is whether or not the rule responds positively to changes in individuals' preferences, that is, whether or not the rule is monotonic. By explicitly considering electoral rules in the context of a complete electoral system-voting, selection of legislature, and legislative choice of policy-we argue that monotonicity in electoral systems is a nonissue: depending on the behavioral model governing individual decision making, either everything is monotonic or nothing is monotonic.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1963173DOIArticle
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1963173JSTORArticle
Additional Information:© 1991 American Political Science Association.
Issue or Number:2
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-145834215
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-145834215
Official Citation:Austen-Smith, David, and Banks Jeffrey. "Monotonicity in Electoral Systems." The American Political Science Review 85, no. 2 (1991): 531-537
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:67314
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Ruth Sustaita
Deposited On:24 May 2016 22:30
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 10:04

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