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Buying Supermajorities in Finite Legislatures

Banks, Jeffrey S. (2000) Buying Supermajorities in Finite Legislatures. American Political Science Review, 94 (3). pp. 677-681. ISSN 0003-0554.

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I analyze the finite-voter version of the Groseclose and Snyder vote-buying model. I identify how the optimal coalition size varies with the underlying preference parameters; derive necessary and sufficient conditions for minimal ma1onty and universal coalitions to form; and show that the necessary condition for minimal majorities found in Groseclose and Snyder is incorrect.

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Additional Information:© 2000 American Political Science Association. This article (previously titled "Buying Minimal Majorities") has benefited greatly from the comments of Tim Groseclose and three anonymous referees, as well as the financial support of the National Science Foundation under grant SES-9975141.
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Issue or Number:3
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-152837001
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Official Citation:Banks, Jeffrey S. "Buying Supermajorities in Finite Legislatures." The American Political Science Review 94.3 (2000): 677-81.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:67317
Deposited By: Ruth Sustaita
Deposited On:24 May 2016 23:19
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 10:04

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