Banks, Jeffrey S. and Weingast, Barry R. (1992) The Political Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric Information. American Journal of Political Science, 36 (2). pp. 509-524. ISSN 0092-5853. doi:10.2307/2111488. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-153913543
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Abstract
We analyze a model of interest group influence where this influence arises from a group's ability to provide relevant information to political actors about regulatory performance. The model rests on three premises: (I) bureaucrats possess an informational advantage, vis-à-vis their political overseers, concerning policy relevant variables; (2) this informational advantage is potentially exploitable by the agency; and (3) politicians anticipate this exploitation and adapt to it in their design of agencies. We show that a major consequence of this anticipation and adaptation is service to organized interest groups.
| Item Type: | Article | |||||||||
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| Additional Information: | © 1992 Midwest Political Science Association. Manuscript received 18 May 1989. Final manuscript submitted 8 August 1991. The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the National Science Foundation under grants SES 87-00468 and SES 86-17516, respectively. We also thank Paul Rubin and Jon Bendor for detailed and valuable comments on an earlier draft. | |||||||||
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| Issue or Number: | 2 | |||||||||
| DOI: | 10.2307/2111488 | |||||||||
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-153913543 | |||||||||
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-153913543 | |||||||||
| Official Citation: | Banks, Jeffrey S., and Weingast Barry R. "The Political Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric Information." American Journal of Political Science 36.2 (1992): 509-524. | |||||||||
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | |||||||||
| ID Code: | 67318 | |||||||||
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | |||||||||
| Deposited By: | Ruth Sustaita | |||||||||
| Deposited On: | 24 May 2016 23:18 | |||||||||
| Last Modified: | 11 Nov 2021 00:30 |
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