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The Political Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric Information

Banks, Jeffrey S. and Weingast, Barry R. (1992) The Political Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric Information. American Journal of Political Science, 36 (2). pp. 509-524. ISSN 0092-5853. doi:10.2307/2111488. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-153913543

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Abstract

We analyze a model of interest group influence where this influence arises from a group's ability to provide relevant information to political actors about regulatory performance. The model rests on three premises: (I) bureaucrats possess an informational advantage, vis-à-vis their political overseers, concerning policy relevant variables; (2) this informational advantage is potentially exploitable by the agency; and (3) politicians anticipate this exploitation and adapt to it in their design of agencies. We show that a major consequence of this anticipation and adaptation is service to organized interest groups.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2111488DOIArticle
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111488JSTORArticle
Additional Information:© 1992 Midwest Political Science Association. Manuscript received 18 May 1989. Final manuscript submitted 8 August 1991. The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the National Science Foundation under grants SES 87-00468 and SES 86-17516, respectively. We also thank Paul Rubin and Jon Bendor for detailed and valuable comments on an earlier draft.
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
NSFSES 87-00468
NSFSES 86-17516
Issue or Number:2
DOI:10.2307/2111488
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-153913543
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-153913543
Official Citation:Banks, Jeffrey S., and Weingast Barry R. "The Political Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric Information." American Journal of Political Science 36.2 (1992): 509-524.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:67318
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Ruth Sustaita
Deposited On:24 May 2016 23:18
Last Modified:11 Nov 2021 00:30

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