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Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control

Banks, J. S. (1985) Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control. Social Choice and Welfare, 1 (4). pp. 295-306. ISSN 0176-1714. doi:10.1007/BF00649265.

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Necessary and sufficient conditions for an alternative to be a sophisticated voting outcome under an amendment procedure are derived. The uncovered set, as first defined by Miller (1980), is shown to be potentially reducible, and conditions are determined for which this reduction equals the set of sophisticated voting outcomes. In addition, simple methods are given for calculating both the uncovered set and its reduction.

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Additional Information:© 1985 Springer. Received May 15, 1984. Accepted September 10, 1984. Presented at the 1984 Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Phoenix AZ, March 1984. I would like to thank Gerald Kramer, Nicholas Miller, Norman Schofield, two anonymous referees, and especially Richard McKelvey for helpful suggestions and comments.
Issue or Number:4
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-154536814
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:67319
Deposited By: Ruth Sustaita
Deposited On:25 May 2016 14:04
Last Modified:11 Nov 2021 00:30

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