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A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice

Banks, Jeffrey S. and Duggan, John (2000) A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice. American Political Science Review, 94 (1). pp. 73-88. ISSN 0003-0554. doi:10.2307/2586381.

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We provide a general theory of collective decision making, one that relates social choices to the strategic incentives of individuals, by generalizing the Baron-F ere john (1989) model of bargaining to the multidimensional spatial model. We prove existence of stationary equilibria, upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium outcomes in structural and preference parameters, and equivalence of equilibrium outcomes and the core in certain environments, including the one-dimensional case. The model generates equilibrium predictions even when the core is empty, and it yields a "continuous" generalization of the core in some familiar environments in which the core is nonempty. As the description of institutional detail in the model is sparse, it applies to collective choice in relatively unstructured settings and provides a benchmark for the general analysis of legislative and parliamentary politics.

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Additional Information:© 2000 American Political Science Association. The authors thank the Editor and three anonymous referees for helpful comments, as well as seminar participants at Caltech, Columbia, Cornell, Duke, ITAM, NYU, Rochester, Stanford, Toronto, Washington University, the 1998 Social Choice and Welfare meetings, the 1998 Wallis Political Economy Conference, the Second Workshop on Coalition Formation in Bilbao, and the 1999 Latin American Econometric Society meetings.
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Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-070919757
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Official Citation:Banks, J., & Duggan, J. (2000). A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice. The American Political Science Review, 94(1), 73-88.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:67325
Deposited By: Ruth Sustaita
Deposited On:26 May 2016 20:48
Last Modified:11 Nov 2021 00:30

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