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Monopoly Agenda Control and Asymmetric Information

Banks, Jeffrey S. (1990) Monopoly Agenda Control and Asymmetric Information. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105 (2). pp. 445-464. ISSN 0033-5533.

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This paper extends the Romer-Rosenthal [1978, 1979] model of monopoly agenda control to an environment where only the agenda setter knows with certainty the outcome associated with a failed proposal. The presence of this asymmetric information implies that any "take-it-or-leave-it" proposal may provide information crucial to the decision calculus of the voters, a fact which an optimal proposal strategy will incorporate. The equilibrium behavior of the agenda setter and voters is characterized and contrasted with that in the complete information environment, and a number of empirical predictions concerning the nature of elections with monopoly controlled agendas are derived.

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Additional Information:© 1990 Oxford University Press. would like to thank Keith Krehbiel, Howard Rosenthal, and seminar participants at the Hoover Institution and Washington University for helpful discussions, and four referees and an editor for constructive criticisms and suggestions. Financial support of the National Science Foundation through grant SES-8700468 is gratefully acknowledged.
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Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-074526852
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Official Citation:Banks, Jeffrey S. "Monopoly Agenda Control and Asymmetric Information." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 105, no. 2 (1990): 445-64.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:67328
Deposited By: Ruth Sustaita
Deposited On:26 May 2016 21:01
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 10:05

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