A Caltech Library Service

Endogenous agenda formation in three-person committees

Banks, J. S. and Gasmi, F. (1987) Endogenous agenda formation in three-person committees. Social Choice and Welfare, 4 (2). pp. 133-152. ISSN 0176-1714. doi:10.1007/BF00450995.

Full text is not posted in this repository. Consult Related URLs below.

Use this Persistent URL to link to this item:


This paper analyzes a 3-person voting game in which two or three players have the ability to choose alternatives to be considered. Once the set of possible alternatives and the structure of the voting procedure are known, the players can solve for the outcome. Thus, the actual choice over outcomes takes place in the choice of alternatives to be voted on, i.e., the agenda. An equilibrium to this agenda-formation game in shown to exist under different assumptions about the information relative to the order of the players in the voting game. Further, this equilibrium is computed and found to possess certain features which are attractive from a normative point of view.

Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription ItemWorking Paper
Additional Information:© 1987 Springer-Verlag. Prepared for delivery at the 1985 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, The New Orleans Hilton, August 29–September 1, 1985. We would like to thank Richard McKelvey, Norman Schofield and two anonymous referees for valuable comments and suggestions. We retain responsibility for remaining errors.
Issue or Number:2
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-100726111
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:67343
Deposited By: Ruth Sustaita
Deposited On:26 May 2016 20:52
Last Modified:11 Nov 2021 00:31

Repository Staff Only: item control page