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Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules

Banks, J. S. and Bordes, G. A. (1988) Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules. Social Choice and Welfare, 5 (1). pp. 31-44. ISSN 0176-1714. http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-101449328

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Abstract

We present four choice functions which characterize the stationary points of sequential search rules derived from a preference relation over outcomes. These functions are contrasted with others in the literature in terms of narrowness of choice as well as their ability to satisfy certain normative and consistency conditions, and it is shown how two of these sets arise as the set of equilibrium outcomes of a voting game under different tie-breaking assumptions.


Item Type:Article
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URLURL TypeDescription
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00435496DOIArticle
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00435496PublisherArticle
Additional Information:© 1988 Springer-Verlag. March 1988. We would like to thank Nicholas Miller for introducing us and two anonymous referees for valuable comments and suggestions.
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-101449328
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-101449328
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:67344
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Ruth Sustaita
Deposited On:26 May 2016 20:37
Last Modified:26 May 2016 20:37

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