A Caltech Library Service

Electoral accountability and incumbency

Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey S. (1989) Electoral accountability and incumbency. In: Models of Strategic Choice in Politics. University of Michigan Press , Ann Arbor, pp. 121-149. ISBN 978-0472101221.

Full text is not posted in this repository.

Use this Persistent URL to link to this item:


This volume's sample of contemporary political theory draws on the rational choice paradigm in general and game theory in particular, and reveals several facts. First, applications of game theory extend beyond the adaptations of those games made familiar by introductory texts—Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken, and simple majority-rule voting games. Second, although the usual domain of research employing the mathematical tools has been elections and legislatures, international relations is now an especially fertile area of inquiry. Finally, because the contributions treat elections, legislative processes, and international relations, we see contemporary theory as an integrated subject. Specific models may employ different assumptions about the structure of strategic interaction, but the logic of game theory is a thread that unites them all.

Item Type:Book Section
Additional Information:© 1989 Regents of the University of Michigan.
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-103321089
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:67345
Deposited By: Ruth Sustaita
Deposited On:26 May 2016 20:27
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 10:05

Repository Staff Only: item control page