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Acyclic social choice from finite sets

Banks, Jeffrey S. (1995) Acyclic social choice from finite sets. Social Choice and Welfare, 12 (3). pp. 293-310. ISSN 0176-1714. doi:10.1007/BF00179983.

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This paper characterizes acyclic preference aggregation rules under various combinations of monotonicity, neutrality, decisiveness, and anonymity, in the spirit of Nakamura's (1979) Theorem on the core of simple games. Each of these characterizations can be seen to follow from Ferejohn and Fishburn's (1979) result on acyclic aggregation rules assuming only independence of irrelevant alternatives. We then state as corollaries to these characterizations extant results such as Sen's (1970) liberal paradox, Blau and Deb's (1977) theorem on the existence of vetoers, and Brown's (1975) theorem on the non-emptiness of the collegium.

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Additional Information:© 1995 Springer-Verlag. I thank David Austen-Smith, Michel Le Breton, Maurice Salles, and two anonymous referees for numerous enlightening conversations and comments. I also thank the National Science Foundation and Sloan Foundation for generous financial assistance.
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Alfred P. Sloan FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Issue or Number:3
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-133219475
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:67354
Deposited By: Ruth Sustaita
Deposited On:26 May 2016 19:53
Last Modified:11 Nov 2021 00:31

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