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Costly signaling and cheap talk in models of political influence

Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey S. (2002) Costly signaling and cheap talk in models of political influence. European Journal of Political Economy, 18 (2). pp. 263-280. ISSN 0176-2680. doi:10.1016/S0176-2680(02)00080-0.

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The motivation for the paper is that, insofar as agents can inflict self-imposed utility losses, purely cheap talk communication is never the only available instrument for information transmission. Given this and the importance of recent work applying cheap talk models to understand a variety of political phenomena, we explore two related questions for the theory. First, what are the equilibrium implications for cheap talk communication when an informed agent is free to use both costless and costly signals and, second, what are the consequences of allowing both sorts of signal for the widespread use of ex ante welfare comparisons as a basis for predictions on the degree of information transmission or institutional choice?

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Additional Information:© 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. Received 1 October 1999, Revised 1 September 2000, Accepted 1 May 2001, Available online 28 May 2002.
Subject Keywords:Costly signaling; Cheap talk; Refinements
Issue or Number:2
Classification Code:JEL classification: D7; D8
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-142040085
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Official Citation:David Austen-Smith, Jeffrey S. Banks, Costly signaling and cheap talk in models of political influence, European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 18, Issue 2, June 2002, Pages 263-280, ISSN 0176-2680, (
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:67359
Deposited By: Ruth Sustaita
Deposited On:26 May 2016 20:43
Last Modified:11 Nov 2021 00:31

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