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Strategic aspects of political systems

Banks, Jeffrey S. (2002) Strategic aspects of political systems. In: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications. Vol.3. Elsevier , Noth Holland, pp. 2203-2228. ISBN 978-0-444-89428-1. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-143117193

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Abstract

Early results on the emptiness of the core and the majority-rule-chaos results led to the recognition of the importance of modeling institutional details in political processes. A sample of the literature on game-theoretic models of political phenomena that ensued is presented. In the case of sophisticated voting over certain kinds of binary agendas, such as might occur in a legislative setting, equilibria exist and can be nicely characterized. Endogenous choice of the agenda can sometimes yield “sophisticated sincerity”, where equilibrium voting behavior is indistinguishable from sincere voting. Under some conditions there exist agenda-independent outcomes. Various kinds of “structure-induced equilibria” are also discussed. Finally, the effect of various types of incomplete information is considered. Incomplete information of how the voters will behave leads to probabilistic voting models that typically yield utilitarian outcomes. Uncertainty among the voters over which is the preferred outcome yields the pivotal voting phenomenon, in which voters can glean information from the fact that they are pivotal. The implications of this phenomenon are illustrated by results on the Condorcet Jury problem, where voters have common interests but different information.


Item Type:Book Section
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03022-9DOIArticle
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1574000502030229PublisherArticle
Additional Information:© 2002 Elsevier B.V. Deceased December 21, 2000. The editors are grateful to David Austen-Smith and Richard McKelvey, who saw the manuscript through the final stages of the production process. It was evident from Jeff's marginal notes that he had intended to add material to the introductory section. However, since the paper seemed otherwise complete, it was decided not to alter the manuscript from the state that Jeff left it in.
Subject Keywords:voting; political theory; social choice; asymmetric information
Classification Code:JEL classification: D71; D72; D82; C70
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-143117193
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-143117193
Official Citation:Jeffrey S. Banks, Chapter 59 Strategic aspects of political systems, Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, 2002, Volume 3, Pages 2203-2228, ISSN 1574-0005, ISBN 9780444894281, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03022-9. (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1574000502030229)
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:67361
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Ruth Sustaita
Deposited On:26 May 2016 20:44
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 10:05

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