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The Design of Institutions: An Agency Theory Perspective

Banks, Jeffrey S. (1995) The Design of Institutions: An Agency Theory Perspective. In: Institutional Design. Recent Economic Thought Series. No.43. Springer Netherlands , New York, NY, pp. 17-36. ISBN 10.1007/978-94-011-0641-2_2. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-082207293

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Abstract

Agency theory provides a systematic analysis of bilateral or multilateral exchange of goods and services in the presence of various factors that bring into question the neoclassical assumption of costless transactions. These factors include most prominently various forms of asymmetric information, wherein one party to an exchange has better information about the consequences of such an exchange than does another. The goal of agency theory is to identify efficient organizational responses to these complicating factors; the intent of this chapter is to survey some of the principle results from this literature and view these as fundamental building blocks in the efficient design of institutions.


Item Type:Book Section
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URLURL TypeDescription
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0641-2_2DOIArticle
http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-011-0641-2_2PublisherArticle
Additional Information:© 1995 Springer.
Series Name:Recent Economic Thought Series
Issue or Number:43
DOI:10.1007/978-94-011-0641-2_2
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-082207293
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-082207293
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:67377
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Ruth Sustaita
Deposited On:26 May 2016 20:17
Last Modified:11 Nov 2021 00:31

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