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The Design of Institutions: An Agency Theory Perspective

Banks, Jeffrey S. (1995) The Design of Institutions: An Agency Theory Perspective. In: Institutional Design. Recent Economic Thought Series. No.43. Kluwer Academic Publishers , Boston, pp. 17-36. ISBN 9780792395034.

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Agency theory provides a systematic analysis of bilateral or multilateral exchange of goods and services in the presence of various factors that bring into question the neoclassical assumption of costless transactions. These factors include most prominently various forms of asymmetric information, wherein one party to an exchange has better information about the consequences of such an exchange than does another. The goal of agency theory is to identify efficient organizational responses to these complicating factors; the intent of this chapter is to survey some of the principle results from this literature and view these as fundamental building blocks in the efficient design of institutions.

Item Type:Book Section
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Additional Information:© 1995 Springer.
Subject Keywords:Nash Equilibrium ; Agency Theory ; Risk Averse ; Institutional Design ; Sharing Rule
Series Name:Recent Economic Thought Series
Issue or Number:43
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-082207293
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:67377
Deposited By: Ruth Sustaita
Deposited On:26 May 2016 20:17
Last Modified:18 Nov 2022 23:55

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