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Existence of Nash Equilibria on Convex Sets

Banks, Jeffrey S. and Duggan, John (2001) Existence of Nash Equilibria on Convex Sets. W. Allen Wallis Institute Working Paper 1998-2001 Working Paper Series, 20. University of Rochester , Rochester, NY. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-100309309

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Abstract

We analyze a non-cooperative game in which the set of feasible strategy profiles is compact and convex but possibly non-rectangular. Thus, a player's feasible strategies may depend on the strategies used by others, as in Debreu's (1952,1982) generalized games. In contrast to the model of Debreu, we do not require preferences to be defined over infeasible strategy profiles, and we do not require a player's feasible strategy correspondence to have non-empty values. We prove existence of Nash equilibria under a lower hemicontinuity condition, and we give examples of classes of games in which this condition is satisfied.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://hdl.handle.net/1802/1078PublisherWorking Paper
Additional Information:© This item is protected by copyright, with all rights reserved. Original Publication Date: 2001.
Subject Keywords:strategic dependence; quasi-concavity; game theory; feasible strategy profiles
Series Name:W. Allen Wallis Institute Working Paper 1998-2001 Working Paper Series
Issue or Number:20
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-100309309
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-100309309
Official Citation:Duggan, John, and Jeffrey Banks. "Existence of Nash Equilibria on Convex Sets." (2001).
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:67382
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Ruth Sustaita
Deposited On:13 Jun 2016 22:49
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 10:05

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